Doubts about the transcendental subject G. Well The "transcendental subject" (M) is an idea (of the general ontological) that refers to all materials in the past, present and those that exist in the future, and is a negative image (the result of segregation contents of the special ontological worldly matters in the course of a dialectical regressus) which segregates all ontological determinations (time, space, embodiment, etc..) minus 2, namely co-determination of content and plurality of content symploké (some extra parts) which makes the alleged object or referent "denoted" by the idea of \u200b\u200bM is infinite (since it is a general ontological matters that overwhelms the universe), eternal (Since it can not apply extratemporal and temporal determination is especially ontological), in constant evolution (as it is not stationary, etc.).
Comments:
1) What evidence is there that the idea of \u200b\u200bM have real references and is not merely an idea hypostatization no real correlates?, And that however rigorous dialectical thought it led to speculation that it is not sufficient to prove the "existence" of an alleged real concerning matters that would exceed the only world we know (and in fact mere speculation, we can not prove any existence because it only tested with empirical data.)
2) Why are segregated from M all the special ontological determinations except the 2 mentioned? Is it because if we segregate the plurality and codetermination of M is no longer matter? And what is the rationale to "stop "segregation of M just in the plurality and codetermination? will be begging to as the plurality and codetermination define matter, M is the subject as" know "that has the attributes of pluralism and co-determination? Looks like it is not arbitrary and ad-hoc "detention" of the segregation of M attributes plurality extra hand parts and codetermination in symploké; equally arbitrary arrest and ad-hoc that the Thomists make engine series or causal series in a stationary engine or an uncaused efficient cause without any logical justification?.
3) Bunge says that the simple idea of \u200b\u200bmatter (not the idea of \u200b\u200btranscendental field) is sufficient to denote not only the current actual objects and processes, but those who were (in the past) and those that will (in the future), then the idea is more crucial matter and is nothing more than pure speculation rationalist dialectic made on a green table tells us nothing about reality.
4) If matter is eternal transcendental, not in the sense of infinite time but in the sense that we can not apply the temporary category, this contradicts the idea that is constantly evolving, as the transformation or removal of the matter is what we denote as TIME, ergo an extratemporal area (which has the attribute of time) can not be in the making (the time is the measure of becoming), and that is to say that the transcendental subject is a-temporal and temporal while what is not only a contradiction in adjecto. More consistent (which is not means to be more true) was the metaphysical substance of Spinoza, as the Sephardic said his substance was extratemporal (as Well MT), but STILL (avoiding the contradiction of a substance ... extratemporal and becoming, which makes good).
